There was a historic event the other day. For the first time since 1981, a new rocket was fired from one of Launch Complex 39’s launch pads at Cape Canaveral. This was a flight test of a part of a rocket under development, called Ares-1.
The flight appeared to be flawless. After battling weather constraints, Ares-1x leaped off of Pad 39B and accelerated into the Florida sky. Reaching an apogee of just a bit over 20 nautical miles, the single stage burned out and separated from the dummy second stage, and descended by parachute to the recovery area in the Atlantic.
What is the future of US Human Spaceflight? Will it include the Ares family of rockets?
This summer, I served as a member of the Review of US Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, chaired by respected aerospace veteran, Norm Augustine. Our charter was to review the current NASA programs, and to present options for the US to move forward. President Obama, through his Science Advisor, wanted a reality check. Our job was not to provide recommendations, but rather to come up with options.
The Augustine Committee, which is how we quickly came to be known, was formed in late May. We presented our options to the White House on August 14, 2009. Later that month, we issued a summary report, and just a week ago (October 22nd), issued our final report.
Since August, the Committee and our reports have come under public attack by the former NASA Administrator, and several members of Congress. Lobbying efforts on behalf of some of the big aerospace companies supporting the program of record have produced videos and other products, vociferously supporting said program. Some members of the “New Space” movement have been loudly complaining that they should get a large piece of the space budget, although most of them haven’t produced anything of significance to date. All of this tells me that the Committee did it about right.
What is surprising to me is that most media and other folk appear confused by what is written in the report. There are headlines and accusations that the Committee called for the end of Ares, the end of Constellation, the throwing of human access to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) to the unproven commercial space arena, and other incorrect assertions. Let me try to set the record straight.
Program of Record (Constellation): The Constellation program was a reasonable way to implement the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE), which was announced by President Bush in 2004. However, it never received anticipated funding, and has suffered several technical and programmatic problems. As a result, estimates show that substantial funding would be required to correct these problems. These high levels of funding would be unreasonable to expect at this time. Moreover, the designs would require large recurring costs to operate, a problem, which plagues NASA. The current program evolved from the original VSE and became almost an exclusively Moon-focused program, and then, presumably in the face of budget shortfalls, almost exclusively an Ares/Orion focused program. The baseline option fits the program of record to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 budget, by moving the milestone dates significantly into the future. No matter how we got to where we are today, it is a valid question to ask, whether America should continue down this path, or whether a different option would be more reasonable. Frankly, public opinion seems ho-hum on a return to the Moon, with a common theme that we have already been there, forty years ago. Even scientists are for the most part, much more interested in Mars, than the Moon.
Space Shuttle: The Space Shuttle is a magnificent flying machine. Although it fell well short of many of its advertised promises, it is a technological marvel. However, its operating costs are very high, and it has had two fatal accidents in almost one hundred thirty flights. In most options, the Committee stated that the current manifest should be flown out, at a reasonable rate. This is estimated to be executable by mid-2011. In one option, the Shuttle would be operated at a minimum flight rate (one to two flights per year) through 2015.
International Space Station (ISS): The ISS is the largest space structure ever assembled. It is a premier microgravity research platform, but also has high costs. One of the most remarkable aspects of the ISS program is the highly successful international framework that has evolved. This framework can and should be expanded, and serve as a basis for future space cooperation. Most options call for operation of the ISS through at least 2020. In the two options, which include the Ares family of rockets, ISS is de-orbited at the end of 2015, because the funds to continue ISS would need to be transferred to the Constellation program. This would have a negative effect on the relationships between the United States and the international partners. In this case, significant doubt would exist, on whether international partners would want to cooperate with the US in future programs. This would also affect other areas of cooperation between the US and these countries.
Heavy Lift Vehicle (HLV): An HLV is needed for exploration beyond LEO. The program of record uses the Ares V vehicle (160 metric tons to LEO), which would require a five and a half segment solid rocket booster, plus a six engine cluster of advanced RS-68 engines, and a ten meter external tank, all three of which have not yet been developed. Shuttle derived options (approx. 85 metric tons to LEO) would use existing Space Shuttle solid rocket boosters, existing 8.3 m external tank and existing Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME). Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) options (approx. 75 metric tons to LEO) would use variants of the Delta IV and possibly Atlas V. A simplified version of Ares V, which the Committee called Ares V Lite (140 metric tons to LEO) would use five segment solid rocket boosters (already tested), a five engine cluster of existing RS-68 engines and a ten meter external tank, which has yet to be developed.
Crew to LEO: The program of record uses Ares-I to launch the Orion crew capsule to LEO. The recurring Ares-I cost has been estimated to be around $300 M per rocket. Indeed, the Ares-Ix test cost was estimated to be approximately $445 M. In alternative options, the Committee put forward the proposition that commercial companies should be given incentives to create a commercial capability to launch astronauts to LEO. The technology has existed for almost fifty years, and several startup companies are working towards that goal. The Committee proposes that the commercial option be created such that it would be attractive, not only for startup aerospace companies, but also for traditional aerospace companies to participate. There is skepticism in the community on whether the startups will be able to deliver, but there should be no doubt that the traditional aerospace companies, who’s predecessors created all US crew vehicles and rockets in the past, could be successful in this effort, if the proper environment was created. The hope in promoting a commercial crew to LEO access would be the saving of funds for NASA in this arena, as well as freeing up NASA resources to concentrate on beyond LEO exploration.
The Committee put forward three classes of options: Options constrained to the FY 2010 budget, Moon first options, and flexible path options. The Committee agreed that the overall goal should be a crewed mission to Mars. Moreover, there should be a balance between human and robotic exploration missions. Scientific research funding should have firewalls, to prevent their funding from being transferred to exploration programs. The Committee also agreed that international partnerships should be expanded, strengthened and applied to future exploration programs. There should be a technology development program to enable efficient, future crewed exploration, beyond LEO. The table below contains a summary of these options.
The Constrained Options fit the FY 2010 budget, but illustrate that the funding would be insufficient to allow significant exploration progress.
The other options call for a funding increase of $3 B per year. The difference within both the Moon First and Flexible Path options, are the choice of HLV, which also affects Crew to LEO choices.
The Moon First options call for concentrated efforts towards Lunar exploration, with an eye towards Mars sometime later. A variation of the program of record is included in this option set. The Moon First options build infrastructure that could be used for future Mars exploration, but the emphasis is on the establishment of infrastructure for Lunar research and exploration.
The Flexible Path options call for building infrastructure for beyond LEO exploration, by traveling to near Earth objects (NEO), Lagrange points, and other interesting flight profiles. The Moon would be included as a destination, but primarily to test hardware and operations. The intention of the Flexible Path options, is to build infrastructure and capability, to enable sustainable Mars exploration in the future.
All options, except for options one and three, include a technology development program. The Committee felt that it was important to develop new capabilities for exploration. The ISS could be used as a test bed for these efforts. As an example, space refueling of cryogenic propellants would be an enabling technology.
This is a simplified, high level, explanation of the results that the Committee has submitted to the White House and NASA. I hope that this helps to make the full report easier to understand. I hope that it is at least clear that the charter of the review committee was to present options to the Administration, not recommendations. I, like everyone else in the business, look forward to the decisions that will be made by the Administration.
13 comments:
A quick question for you if I may, is the SSME HLV the inline or side-mounted version? As I understand it the side-mounted version might be more compatible with current STS infrastructure, however the inline version has more capacity for lift and volume increase. I also applaud you for trying to set straight the entire notion of commercial crew launch versus the "nuspace" ordeal. I don't think that many people realize that Atlas V and Delta IV were mainly funded by their respected corporations during development, heck NASA has paid a larger percentage for COTS vehicles than the DoD did for EELV. Anyhow, thank you for your insight and service to your country!
Dr.Chiao, I have one problem with your committees evaluation of NASA's Sidemount shuttle concept. In your report, you state that a manned lunar mission using the SD-HLV requires-- three-- launches?
But the concept that John Shannon presented to your committee requires only two SD-HLV launches. Also, NASA's more extensively detailed examination of the SD-HLV concept on June 25 indicated that up to 100 tonnes of payload could be placed into LEO using an EDS and nearly 48 tonnes into lunar orbit. The lunar vehicle for the Ares 1/V uses only a 45 tonne Altair and is capable of transporting only 71 tonnes into lunar orbit while two sidemount launches (Orion/Altair) could transport at least 95 tonnes into lunar orbit.
And since the Orion space craft weighs only 22 tonnes, a SD-HLV should be able to transport both the Orion and 25 tonnes of extra payload into lunar orbit. 25 tonnes is more than 50% larger than the original Apollo lunar landing vehicle. So, in theory, a manned lunar mission using the SD-HLV could require only one launch. Two SD-HLV launches could place a manned lander on the Moon plus more than 10 tonnes of cargo for placing lunar base components, robots, and machinery on the Moon.
Here's NASA's pdf on the enhanced mass capabilities of the SD-HLV to lunar orbit:
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/space/orl-alternative-rocket-pdf,0,7079469.htmlpage
Hi Guys,
Thanks for your comments!
By Shuttle derived, we meant either the Sidemount or Direct configurations.
As for number of launches for a Lunar flight, of course it depends on the size of the lander and earth departure stage.
The point is, there are HLV options.
Leroy
Thank you Dr. Chiao. To quote from page 93 of your committee's final review:
"Among the other notable differences between the Ares V family and the more-directly Shuttle-derived launcher family is the mission-launch reliability. Since the latter requires three launches for each planned Constellation lunar mission,there would be a somewhat lower reliability in any given time window than would be provided by the Ares V, which only would require two launches in the same time window."
But as you noted, this depends on the size of the EDS stage. The EDS stage proposed by the NASA researchers would only require two flights to have the same capability and reliability as the Ares 1/V configuration. And if a smaller lunar lander (25 tonnes or less) were used, it would require only one flight of an SD-HLV per manned lunar mission.
So I guess I don't see why NASA would ever develop a SD-HLV for a three flight configuration per manned mission when they could easily use a two flight or even a one flight configuration with a large EDS stage. And I'm sure John Shannon will argue the same thing.
So I hope you'll inform Mr. Bolden and the President of this fact concerning the SD-HLV and EDS size which I believe is much faster and cheaper to develop than the Ares 1/V vehicle.
Thanks for allowing me to comment on this subject on your blog!
This whole problem is from lack of money. Recurring cost. And the recurring cost is from the too-large government funded workforce.
This is the elephant that we stay silent about. People would rather keep their jobs (temporary security) than better their country.
The rockets are irrelevant as long as the people and the politicians are too corrupt and greedy to fix the real problem.
Build another Saturn V-class rocket. Go ahead. It will be scrapped just like the last one was.
Every 10 years congress comes around & says NASA's last shuttle replacement won't work & cancels the program. So now we've burned through X-33 & Ares 1 with yet a 3rd shuttle replacement undoubtedly to get canceled in 2019. The mission shouldn't be figuring out an architecture but figuring out how to satisfy obligations. Suspect government is just going to keep sucking money canceling program after program until Dragon finally gets off the ground somewhere around 2050 & the problem works itself out naturally.
It is unfortunate that, again, America's aerospace efforts are mired in study. Study is another method by which politicians send projects to the graveyard, and the end of NASA's human space exploration seems to be in play.
We look back at how America pushed forward with the Apollo project and think highly of our nation and NASA. But critics of the program at that time, and later, saw through the focused efforts and saw our space agency doing what it could with an ever-dwindling budget and support-base which compromised both safety and science. By the time one mission had completed, another was ready to launch, all before the science of the preceding mission could be understood and applied to the next. As in any government program, the next budget is largely determined by what you spent from the last one. In NASA's case, particularly with Apollo, seemingly sitting idle would be an indicator that the program was failing and the money could be spent elsewhere, meaning for war.
Little argument is raised for blowing stuff up. Lots of fuss is made over NASA's (compared to defense) paltry budget. Yet NASA's work has the highest rate of social return of almost any government program I can think of. It provides interesting work. It brings progress and innovation. It inspires. It helps our planet. And we learn more about our world, universe, and our place on this "pale blue dot".
I do not share Dr. Chiao's view, and probably should defer to it as he was a prime member of the Commission itself. As a long time citizen observer of the way America works, my pessimism rises to the occasion.
Mark, the plan of record and the plan developed under the ESAS are now completely different and therefore should be restudied. For instance, after ESAS Ares I was a four segment booster with an SSME derived upperstage engine. After the report was finished, Dr. Griffin dropped the air started SSME and replaced it with the lower performing J-2X to save money on engine development (J-2X is restartable, and needed for Ares V). As a result a higher performing booster was needed, resulting in another segment to the booster. The 5-seg/J-2X version is a completely different vehicle to the 4-SSME powered version. Of course due to the still under performing Ares I 5-segment version, the Ares V ballooned to enormous proportions. Currently it Has a 10 meter core, 5.5 segment composite disposable boosters not in common with Ares I , six RS-68 engines (with base heating issues) and at its current weight cannot be lifted by the current crawler transporters. Not to mention it still cannot lift enough for the Constellation baseline program right now. Originally the Ares V was only going to be an 8.4 meter core with shuttle tank dimensions, however now the designs have ballooned way beyond their original designs while no additional funding needed to maintain the program as promised by Congress have materialized. The truth of the matter is that we should be checking to see if we are going down the right path, and if not how can we most effectively turn to a new route. I can tell you many of these alternatives take existing Constellation work and incorporate it into their plans, so we will not have wasted time.
It is not clear from reading the Augustine report, and other interpretations, whether the Flexible Path includes a stop on the lunar surface, and if it does, when that would occur, Any journey begins at the beginning of its path, not at the middle or the end. If boots on the moon do not happen early, the Flexible Option gives us little hope of learning how to put boots on other worlds. Flexible Path is supportable if done in a logical progression. NEO's, L's, and Mars are great waypoints and goals, but a logical progression is needed otherwise, Flexible path fails and is not supportable. Note that the implementation of Flexible Path described here is goal driven, not destination driven.
I think its pretty obvious that if we ever go to Mars that the first astronauts are probably going to have to stay there several months if not a couple of years.
The only way were going to learn about long periods of survival on the surface of Mars is by practicing how to survive in habitats for several months or years on the surface of the Moon. This way, we can work out all of the kinks of living in habitat modules on a world that's only a few days away instead of a-- few months away.
It appeared to me the Ares-IX had a serious re-contact event at staging which may have done serious damage to the parachutes. I only saw a few seconds before NASA TV justifiably cut off the video showing the two sections tumbling out of control.
I can imagine that the people privileged enough to see the whole thing have made the same conclusion. The cause of this re-contact is from the SRBs still burning and producing thrust at staging.
This leads to more credibility for using the side-mounted SRBs instead of an in-line stack. The other safety benefit of side-mounted SRBs is that all engines are ignited and working before liftoff.
If any engines fail to ignite before liftoff, you can find out why with proof-in-hand since they are sitting safely on the ground. On the other hand, a staging event in which a failed engine ignition attempt long after liftoff cannot result in the failed engine being salvaged to determine why it did not ignite. This could easily bring the program to a screeching halt since people cannot isolate the cause of the problem and show proof-in-hand.
The customer knows this and may decide up front that stacked rockets in which the second stage engines are ignited in-flight may not be as reliable as ignited engines sitting on the pad.
Hi Leroy, You state that the POR is compatible with the VSE.
The Vision for Space Exploration goals are.
1. • Implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond;
2.• Extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations;
3.• Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration; and
4.• Promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security,
and economic interests.
My contention is that Ares I/V is the opposite of what the VSE called for.
#1. Ares isn't affordable or sustainable. $35 to $45 Billion development. 20 Ares I's cost $2 billion each in development and $300 million for the actual rocket costing a unbelievable $2.3 billion per launch.
#2. I don't think 2020 is possible with Ares I not ready till 2017 and we have not even started Ares V.
#3. With most of the money going into development of the Ares launchers it will starve the rest of NASA of funds needed to build the machines we need once we get into space. Also many of the robotic missions have been robbed to pay for Ares development.
#4. Ares does nothing to involve international partners. Ares does nothing to involve commercial partners. Ares is certainly not economical. What science can be done if all the money is tied up in the launchers?
In Ron Smith's 2nd post he hits the nail on the head. Ares I was suppose to use SSME and 4 segment SRB. Changing from the SSME to the J2-x gives us something other than a shuttle derived launcher. It is way beyond time to kill Ares and go back to the VSE.
Eo: Astronaut Leroy Chiao and Bloggers:
Please note points of convergence between the Summary Report of the Augustine Committee and the UPLIFT (ARES VI) solution of the Rocket Science Institute.
The Space Shuttle: provide for an extension of Shuttle at a minimum safe flight rate, following recertification, to preserve U.S. capability to launch astronauts into space.
The International Space Station: the returns of ISS to both the United States and the international partners would be significantly enhanced by extension of ISS life to 2020.
The Orion Spacecraft: no evidence that the current design will not be acceptable for its wide variety of tasks in the exploration program.
The Heavy-Lift Launch Vehicle: building a single NASA vehicle [on which (both) Orion and Altair are launched] could reduce costs and accelerate heavy-lift development (see ARES VI).
The Orion Launch Vehicle: because of technical and budget issues, the ARES I no longer supports the US needs.
The Moon First: is a viable exploration strategy, “before going to Mars we would be well served gaining experience working on the lunar surface.”
The Funding Issue: no plan compatible with the (existing) budget profile permits human exploration to continue; resources at (an appropriate) level are required
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